The use of ghost fleets flying African flags threatens maritime interests and foreign investment.
Sweden recently intercepted two cargo ships suspected of belonging to the Russian ghost fleet, flying Comorian and Guinean flags. Swedish authorities believe these flags were used fraudulently, a method typical of criminal networks.
Global maritime transport data from the past year reveals a sharp increase in the number of ships flying the flags of African countries, used in ghost fleets.
These networks are loosely structured groups of oil tankers and cargo ships used to circumvent international sanctions or trade blockades. Ghost fleets operate through shadowy shipowners and transfer cargo in international waters, as well as manipulating or disabling transponders to conceal their movements. The ship’s flag is another key tool that allows it to evade sanctions.
Under international law, all merchant ships operating beyond territorial waters must fly a flag. In exchange for a fee, the flag state assumes regulatory responsibility for the ship, thus limiting boarding or the application of other countries’ laws on the high seas.
Flag State oversight varies. Indeed, some shipowners register their vessels in registries with simplified procedures, fees, and relaxed compliance rules. This remains legal, but these « flags of convenience » can create regulatory loopholes that are sometimes exploited for illicit purposes.
Maritime circumvention of sanctions is not a new phenomenon, but the operations of ghost fleets are now distinguished by their scale and sophistication. Recent sanctions against major oil exporters are incentivizing continued shipments despite restrictions, leading to investments in alternative maritime networks to guarantee supply.
According to the IMO, more than 50% of reported cases of flags of convenience involve African countries.
Increased control by flag-owning states has prompted operators of ghost fleets to seek new registries in Africa. With the exception of Liberia, the continent plays a marginal role in the global ship registration system.
In recent years, there has been an exponential increase in registered tonnage in Benin, Gambia, Comoros, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. In Cameroon, the maritime register increased by 126% during the past year, due to the rapid registration of high-risk tankers linked to the Russian ghost fleet.
Ships lacking legal registration or fraudulently using a country’s flag are even more worrying. Earlier this year, Germany identified the oil tanker Range Vale as part of Russia’s ghost fleet after it falsely registered in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe reported the fraudulent issuance of the certificates to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), but the ship continues to operate under the Sierra Leonean flag.
Several African countries do not maintain international registers. After identifying eight cases of fraud, Malawi informed the IMO that it did not offer international registration. In 2024, the IMO found that all of Eswatini’s flags were fraudulent following false declarations by several ships. Eswatini does not have a maritime register and is not a member of the IMO.
The organization confirmed last month that more than half of the false flag cases involved African states. Eighty-three oil tankers, cargo ships, and container ships were allegedly registered in the Comoros – the most popular flag on the list.
Is this practice a choice made by countries seeking to circumvent sanctions? Or are African states being exploited by private registry operators? It is not uncommon for governments to entrust the management of registries to companies, which can lead to fraud.
States that facilitate the circumvention of sanctions expose themselves to port state inspections
African flags – legal or illegal – offer limited law enforcement capacity compared to established registries. Maritime compliance agencies must contend with vessels of uncertain ownership, complicating the monitoring of unscrupulous actors.
African registries also attract less attention from international regulatory bodies, insurers or monitoring programs, thus offering a discreet option for ships operating illegally.
This has two important consequences for African states. First, countries suspected of facilitating the circumvention of sanctions expose themselves to increased port state inspections, insurance restrictions or diplomatic pressure, which can harm the interests of the maritime sector, trade costs and foreign investment.
The second concerns maritime security – an often overlooked issue. Faced with increased surveillance of ghost fleet vessels in the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, these ships could bypass the Cape of Good Hope, notorious for its dangers.
Many of these ships, some of which fly the African flag, are aging and lack adequate insurance. This increases the risk of environmental disasters in African waters and complicates the issue of legal liability and compensation in the event of an incident.
African states must avoid becoming facilitators or accomplices in illicit activities. Allowing the malicious use of a flag state undermines the credibility of governance, for which governments bear ultimate responsibility, even in the presence of private intermediaries.
Several African states have undertaken reforms in response to international criticism
Several African states have undertaken reforms in response to international criticism. The Prime Minister of Cameroon, Joseph Dion Ngute, announced the removal from the national register of ships suspected of belonging to the ghost fleet, as well as the strengthening of regulatory controls.
Similar processes are underway in the Comoros, while Madagascar has implemented a system to improve fraud detection and authentication. However, further action is needed to prevent flag hijacking.
First, African states should strengthen registry governance, ensuring that new ships meet safety, environmental, and legal requirements. Second, they should regulate private registry operators, require disclosure of ship ownership, and align registration procedures with international best practices.
Finally, enhanced cooperation with regional maritime security initiatives and information-sharing platforms would enable African states to identify high-risk vessels before they are registered.
These measures can protect countries’ reputations, reduce their exposure to illicit activities, and ensure that ghost fleets do not operate under their flags.
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source : issafrica
