The Saudi kingdom has recently brought its rivalry with the United Arab Emirates in the Yemeni conflict into the open. Their distant confrontation is also expanding across the Red Sea, in East Africa. Saudi Arabia seems more determined than ever to act on the African shore of the Red Sea, a region it considers vital to its national security against its UAE rival, and a key lever for its economic development.
A sign of this diplomatic activism: on 7 January, while Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud was in Washington discussing the security of “Yemen and Sudan” with his American counterpart Marco Rubio, his deputy, Walid bin Abdulkarim, was in Port Sudan, the de facto capital of the government of Sudanese General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, to discuss the ongoing conflict in the country.
“It is a giant slowly but surely waking up to stabilize the Red Sea shores in the face of Emirates betting on the destabilization of African states,” said a Western diplomat stationed in East Africa.
Riyadh is seeking to regain influence in the Horn of Africa against Abu Dhabi, which has invested heavily in recent years to build alliances in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia.
The opposition between the two powers came to light on 30 December 2025 in Yemen. Saudi Arabia bombed a shipment of weapons from the UAE destined for the Yemeni separatists of the Southern Transitional Council, then accused Abu Dhabi of acting in an “extremely dangerous” manner in Yemen.
Support for General Al-Burhan
Saudi engagement on the western shore of the Red Sea was evident on 19 November 2025, during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (“MBS”) visit to the White House, when he personally asked Donald Trump to get involved in resolving the war in Sudan. According to The Economist, the Saudi leader even suggested that the U.S. president impose additional sanctions on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary militia controlling Darfur and supported militarily by Abu Dhabi.
The Sudanese conflict illustrates the realignment of Saudi diplomacy in Africa. Long seen as a potential mediator in inter-Sudanese negotiations in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia is now drawing closer to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Al-Burhan, opposed to the RSF. The Sudanese leader was received in Riyadh with full honors in mid-December.
“MBS has approved financial support for the SAF,” a diplomatic source said. The Sudanese army counts Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar among its allies, three countries with which Mohammed bin Salman has recently reconciled – hinting at a new strategic axis.
Saudi Arabia’s awakening follows an event in its immediate neighborhood at the end of December 2025. On 26 December, four days before Saudi strikes in southern Yemen, Israel recognized the independence of Somaliland, a self-declared separatist Somali republic strategically located along the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, opposite Yemen’s coast. The Saudi kingdom strongly condemned this move in a joint statement with Iran, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt.
Israel’s presence south of the Red Sea is another red line for Riyadh, which sees this development as deepening the tacit alliance between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi. The UAE has close ties with the Somali secessionist region, having acquired the port and airport of the coastal city of Berbera in 2016. These facilities were reportedly used by Emirati intelligence on 7 January to exfiltrate the leader of the Southern Transitional Council, Aidroos Al-Zubaidi, from Yemen, according to Saudi media.
In the past, Riyadh struggled to consolidate alliances in the Horn of Africa. An initial attempt failed in 2019 with the creation of the Red Sea Council, an eight-country alliance meant to secure maritime traffic in the area, which remained a hollow shell.
Investing further
Three years earlier, the Saudi military had abandoned plans to establish a base in Djibouti despite local approval. Illustrating Saudi disinterest in the continent, the position of Secretary of State for African Affairs within the Foreign Ministry has been vacant since 2023, according to Africa Intelligence.
“It was always surprising to see the Saudis so absent on African matters, whereas if any country should care about developments in Africa, it is Saudi Arabia, as its security on the western border depends on it,” said Justin Lynch, director of the think tank Conflict Insights Group.
However, Saudi Arabia’s approach to Africa has recently evolved, with increased involvement in the Horn’s affairs. To counter UAE maritime ambitions, Riyadh secured the concession of the Djiboutian port of Tadjoura for thirty years in October 2025. This initiative reflects the kingdom’s desire for a lasting presence along African maritime routes. “The Saudi Public Investment Fund has been instructed to be more entrepreneurial in Africa in logistics and agriculture over the past year,” said a Horn of Africa-based businessman.
Another emerging crisis drawing Saudi attention involves tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Mohammed bin Salman invited Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to Riyadh twice in 2025, seeking to make him a bulwark against Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s expansionism, and indirectly, that of his Emirati patron.
